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Candide, or Pessimism:
Fighting Piracy and Transnational Crime in Uncharted Waters
Introduction
In the renowned work by Voltaire, Candide, or Optimism, 
originally published in French in 1759,1  Voltaire sets out 
to contrast Leibnizian optimism,2  where “all is for the 
best in the best of all possible worlds”, with a more real-
ist, if not disillusioned world view. While “optimism” in 
Leibniz’ work usually refers to the classical sense of “op-
timal”, not the mood-related sense of being positively 
hopeful, and hence does not stand in direct opposition 
to the contemporary meaning of “pessimism”, contrast-
ing the two nevertheless illustrates opposing points of 
view in an ongoing debate. Contemplating piracy and 
transnational crimes, optimists may claim that “all is for 
the best”, i.e. that domestic and international efforts at 
1 Candide, ou l’Optimisme, published simultaneously in 
five countries that year.
2 Established in particular in Théodicée, published in 1710, 
where Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz asserted that all apparent imper-
fections in the world in fact are optimal in the sense of represent-
ing the best possible in the best of all worlds
fighting those crimes are optimal, or “as good as it gets.” 
Pessimists may point to the enormity of the task con-
sidering the sheer extent of the problems and resort 
to capitulation ab initio. While the former point of view 
would surely be overly optimistic, adopting the latter 
seems to suggest itself as more appropriate in the face 
of globally rising rates of piracy and transnational crimes 
committed. Considering concerted efforts directed at 
preventing and prosecuting piracy and other transna-
tional crimes, and a greater willingness to address the 
root causes of these menaces, resorting to pessimism 
appears to be equally premature. But an effective re-
sponse may depend on sailing uncharted waters.
To be sure, piracy is not equivalent to transnational 
crime, though it may share most of the characteristics 
of the latter. Furthermore, piracy is not always or neces-
sarily related to waterways in general or the High Seas 
in particular, as is commonly assumed, since it may also 
refer to criminal acts committed against aircraft, per-
sons, or (other) property outside the jurisdiction of any 
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Abstract
While Somali pirates have been dominating the headlines in recent years, piracy and armed robbery at sea represents a 
widespread phenomenon throughout the world’s most traveled waterways. Having a piracy problem in one’s “maritime 
backyard” exposes the inadequacy of the coastal state’s patrolling and prosecutorial capacity and adds to the incen-
tives of criminal enterprises to operate in the area. In order to contain the threat posed by piracy, various national and 
international efforts at patrolling and policing the oceans, and prosecuting pirates, have been initiated—often, however, 
without capturing the root causes of the problem. While the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines 
specific acts of piracy, it does not include financing and other “secondary activities”, which typically create and sustain 
piracy networks. This article argues that regarding pirate activities through the lenses of transnational organized crime 
may provide a more adequate basis for addressing piracy.
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state. Here, however, the focus will be on maritime pira-
cy as defined in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982), i.e. 
on “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act 
of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew 
or the passengers of a private ship … and directed: (i) 
on the high seas, against another ship …” or “against a 
ship … outside the jurisdiction of any State” (UNCLOS 
1982: Art. 101).  
While similar to piracy in many regards, armed robbery 
against ships pertains to such acts happening “within 
a State’s jurisdiction over such offences” (IMO 2009a). 
However, where the main problems in fighting the re-
spective underlying crimes against persons or property 
consist of the lack of jurisdictional approaches taken, i.e. 
in the near absence of states having promulgated and 
enacted laws against such illegal acts, assuming juris-
diction, and actually prosecuting and punishing perpe-
trators committing those crimes, armed robbery at sea 
may, in effect, pose challenges similar to those of piracy. 
Therefore, while this article will, in the main, focus on 
piracy, examples of armed robbery at sea will also occa-
sionally be related, especially where its consequences 
may be regarded as sharing equally descriptive charac-
teristics of transnational crime as may be true of piracy. 
In the face of a profound lack of jurisdictional approach-
es developed based on UNCLOS provisions, alternative 
legal bases would be desirable. If piracy could be sub-
sumed under the definition of transnational organized 
crime included in the UN Palermo Convention of 15 
December 2000, prosecutorial options in regard pi-
racy would multiply. Hence, in the following I will first 
outline common characteristics of transnational crime 
and evaluate how far piracy may fit that description, fol-
lowed by juxtaposing the threat of piracy off the coast 
of Nigeria with the one off the coast of Somalia, as rep-
resentatives of different ends of the weak state-failed 
state continuum. I will then turn to looking into region-
al and international efforts and arrangements aimed at 
preventing and punishing piracy, before attempting 
to assess to what degree the above actions may be re-
garded as successful in the fight against piracy.   
Is Piracy a Transnational Crime?
Few things delight an international jurist more than be-
ing asked whether piracy may be considered a trans-
national crime, as it allows for responding with that 
perhaps most revered of all replies in the business of 
the law: “it depends”. Employing the definition included 
in the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (UNCTOC), an offense is transnational 
in nature if: (a) it is committed in more than one State; 
(b) it is committed in one State but a substantial part 
of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes 
place in another State; (c) it is committed in one State 
but involves an organized criminal group that engages 
in criminal activities in more than one State; or (d) it is 
committed in one State but has substantial effects in 
another State.
Looking at the above list, offenses related to piracy are 
often committed in more than one State (a). Further-
more, an act of piracy usually involves preparation and 
planning in a state different from the locus of the ac-
tual attack. Most pirate endeavours never would have 
seen the light of day without supplying equipment 
and funds, and acquisition of, e.g., rocket-propelled 
grenades and other sophisticated assault hardware, 
which tends to have its origin in various, other coun-
tries (b) and is mainly procured with the help of or-
ganized criminal groups engaged in criminal activities 
in more than one State (c). Finally, in a way the “one-
size-fits-all” category, it seems fair to assume that acts 
of piracy may have substantial effects in another State 
(d). In fact, due to the mere disruption of international 
shipping and the concomitantly increased costs, which 
eventually will have to be paid, inter alia, by consumers 
in the various countries of destination, piracy may have 
a major impact on a global level and thus, in any case, 
would satisfy the criteria set out in (d). The estimates of 
direct and indirect costs of Somali piracy alone range 
from USD 1 billion to USD 16 billion due to significantly 
increased insurance premiums, avoidance (i.e., choos-
ing the alternate route around the Cape of Good Hope, 
which adds roughly 3,500 miles to the journey), and de-
terrence (e.g., heightening onboard security, deploying 
frigates, etc.) (Chalk 2008: 16). 
Of course, employing a narrow construction of the 
transnational nature of a crime, piracy would always fall 
outside that definition from the outset, based on the 
requirement of the crime having been committed in 
one, or more than one, State, as piracy has been de-
fined as an offense taking place on the High Seas, or in 
any other place outside (the jurisdiction of ) any State 
(UNCLOS 1982: Art. 101).  Armed robbery against ships, 
on the other hand, would not generally be excluded 
from the above definition (provided the other require-
ments are fulfilled).
However, apart from the at times unconvincing division 
between armed robbery at sea and piracy on the High 
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Seas with a view to the, in many respects, similar crimi-
nal acts involved, such a narrow reading of the nature 
of piracy overlooks or disregards the fact that acts of 
piracy consist of more than the mere attack on another 
vessel, its crew etc., on the High Seas. It often (most 
prominently perhaps in the case of piracy off the coast 
of Somalia) involves forcing a captured ship into the ter-
ritorial waters of a State, (especially where that territorial 
state is too weak to enforce the law within its territory), 
perhaps unloading its cargo, illicitly trading in its cargo, 
taking hostages, exerting ransoms, mutatis mutandis.  
Hence, piracy usually consists of more than whatever 
takes place on the High Seas; in effect, the various, dis-
tinguishable acts ultimately combine to form the (one) 
act of piracy. Recognising that without those other 
(partial) acts taking place within the jurisdiction of at 
least one state, and often also ashore, the respective 
act of piracy would not be successfully completed, but 
reduced e.g. to the mere act of capturing a vessel, also 
piracy may be regarded as a transnational crime.3  As 
may be clear from the above, in any event, the proper 
definition of the transnational nature of a criminal activ-
ity depends on the particular circumstances of the case.
Finally, taking into account that piracy, in part, if not in 
the main, involves acts taking place on the High Seas, 
outside the jurisdiction of any state, it may to a cer-
tain extent be regarded as the ultimate transnational 
crime—transcending all boundaries and hence go-
ing even further than the traditional concept of the 
transnational nature of a crime: piracy as an “ablative”4 
crime. If so, subsuming piracy under the definition of 
transnational organized crime included in the Palermo 
Convention has farther reaching consequences. The 
Convention obliges States Parties to criminalize partici-
pation in an organized criminal group, corruption, the 
laundering of the proceeds of crime, and the obstruc-
tion of justice5  (UNDOC 2000: Arts. 5, 6, 8, and 23). It 
thus focuses on so-called “enabling” or “secondary ac-
3 Considering that there may be a connection between 
terrorist and criminal groups, including pirates, further contributes 
to the at times opaque nature of transnational crimes. Somalia’s 
Al-Shabaab, designated by the U.S. government as a foreign ter-
rorist organization in 2008, has been linked to pirates operating off 
Somalia’s coast (Rollins & Wyler 2010, pp. 29-30). A recent incident 
at a resort north of Lamu, Kenya, further underlines the shifting 
nature and fleeting categorization of piracy. During the armed at-
tack, believed to be attributable to Somali pirates, a British man 
was shot dead and his wife kidnapped (Al Jazeera 2011).
4 Here employed to denote being removed from or elevated 
from “ordinary” depictions of transnational organized crime.
5 For a comprehensive study on the Palermo Convention, 
see McClean (2007).
tivities” characteristic of organized crime, as opposed to 
the “primary activities”, i.e. the underlying core crimes 
(Hauck and Peterke 2010: 420). Adopting such an ap-
proach with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea 
would have the advantage of not confining the reach 
of the law to those actually taking part in a specific pi-
rate attack, but targeting everyone contributing to the 
piracy endeavour, from the one’s providing logistics 
and assault weapons to the “silent shareholders” and 
financiers—provided they could be linked somehow 
to the (transnational) organized crime committed. The 
Convention does not lay down a legal definition of that 
term; it merely stipulates that “organized criminal group” 
shall mean a “structured group of three or more persons, 
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with 
the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or 
offences established in accordance with this Conven-
tion, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial 
or other material benefit” (UNDOC 2000: Art. 2a).  The 
“structured group” shall not be randomly formed, but 
neither does it need to have formally defined roles for 
its members, continuity of its membership or a devel-
oped structure (UNDOC 2000: Art. 2c).
Other treaties obliging states parties have employed 
equally broad definitions of “organized crime”.  By virtue 
of European Union (EU) law, in particular Article 83 (1) 
and 87 (2) (c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union,6  EU Member States have committed 
themselves to a supranational demand imposed on 
their national laws to fight organized crime. According 
to Council Framework Decision of 24 October 2008 on 
the fight against organized crime, the term “criminal or-
ganization” is defined as:
a structured association, established over a pe-
riod of time, of more than two persons acting 
in concert with a view to committing offences 
which are punishable by deprivation of liberty 
or a detention order of a maximum of at least 
four years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, financial or other material 
benefit (Council Framework Decision 2008: Art. 1).
In sum, taking the organizational characteristics and lo-
gistical needs of pirate gangs into account, most acts 
of piracy and armed robbery at sea would seem to fulfil 
the requirements of the definition of transnational or-
ganized crime. Hence, whereas UNCLOS defines only 
6 C 115/47 (entered into force on 1 December 2009), Of-
ficial Journal of the European Union, 9 May 2008.
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the illegality of committing certain acts of violence, de-
tention, or depredation (UNCLOS 1982: Art. 101) , sub-
suming piracy under the Palermo Convention enables 
and obliges states to focus on the underlying (trans-
national, organized) criminal structures sustaining and 
fuelling a piracy network, thus broadening the scope 
and potential effect of prosecutorial counter-piracy ef-
forts. But, as with any such efforts, while effective law 
enforcement starts with legislative will, it ultimately de-
pends on enforcement capabilities. The impact of the 
latter on the success of fighting piracy will be illustrated 
in the following. 
The Weak State/Failed State 
Paradigm
Although pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia ac-
counted, by far, for the greatest share of all attacks in 
recent years, piracy is not an unknown phenomenon in 
the waters off Nigeria, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, or 
Tanzania, and thus constitutes a serious global problem 
with potentially significant geopolitical repercussions. 
The dubious honour of being associated with a piracy-
infested region increases pressure towards falling into 
the latter category of the weak state/failed state con-
tinuum. Having a piracy problem in one’s “maritime 
backyard” exposes the inadequacy of the coastal state’s 
patrolling, policing, and prosecutorial capacity, thus 
adding to the incentives of criminal enterprises to oper-
ate in the area, further undermining the legitimacy of an 
already weak government, and risking pushing it even 
closer to the failed state label (Syring 2011: 438). 
The number of acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships reported to the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO) in 2010 was 489 and thus represented an in-
crease of 20.4 % against the 406 reported incidents in 
2009. During the year 2008 those numbered 306 (IMO 
2011a). Yet, despite international awareness and con-
tinued attention to the problem, a decisive reversal of 
the trend still seems to be quite distant.
The Case of Nigeria
Based on IMO’s latest Annual Report on Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships, West Africa accounted 
for 47 of all reported incidents in 2010, a figure that has 
been quite stable over the past couple of years. The 
majority of those incidents occurred off the coast of 
Nigeria, and its immediate maritime neighbours (IMO 
2010). Nigeria is Africa’s leading oil producer and one 
of the world’s largest oil exporters (CIA 2009)7; yet, few 
Nigerians, including those living in the country’s oil-
producing areas, have benefited from the oil wealth, 
which has fuelled increasing discontent with, and vio-
lence against, the oil infrastructure (BBC 2011).  
While hijackings and attacks on vessels have been a 
common feature, the most prominent upsurge of crim-
inal activities in that region pertained to theft of cargo 
in general, and of crude oil in particular, the latter also 
known as illegal oil bunkering. In addition to the direct 
theft of cargo carrying crude oil, other types of illegal 
oil bunkering include small-scale pilfering for the lo-
cal market, large-scale tapping of pipelines to fill large 
tankers for export, and excess lifting of crude oil beyond 
the licensed amount. While the exact amount of oil sto-
len per day is unknown8  it is estimated to range from 
30,000 to 300,000 barrels, causing a loss to the Nigerian 
economy from 2003 to 2008 totalling approximately 
USD 100 billion (Asuni 2009).  
According to the constitution, all minerals, oil and gas 
in Nigeria belong to the federal government. The pos-
session of crude oil by an individual or group other 
than those licensed is punishable under the law. Not-
withstanding legal provisions in place, theft of Nigeria’s 
crude oil has been a decade-long issue and in recent 
years has been on the rise. Despite (or perhaps, be-
cause of ) strong indications implicating top govern-
ment officials, the military and some leading civilian 
Nigerians, none of these high-ranking individuals have 
been brought to account for their criminal activities so 
far (allAfrica 2011). New methods for identifying the 
particular sources of oil may contribute to curbing the 
sale of illicit9  or “blood oil”. Recognizing that every drop 
of crude oil has its own DNA, and is different for every 
oil well, DNA certificates for each oil supply have been 
put forward as a solution, requiring authenticating pa-
pers prior to any oil transaction (This Day Live 2011). 
The underlying idea is that one should be able to go 
7 Nigeria was ranked as number 8 in terms of oil exported, 
including both crude oil and oil products, with an estimated oil 
exported of 2, 102, 00 barrels per day (CIA 2009).
8 This is, of course, in part because the Nigerian govern-
ment to date does not even have exact numbers for the amount 
of oil legally produced per day.
9 It is not illegal, in general, to trade (both selling and buy-
ing) in oil, though it is illegal to sell or acquire “blood oil” or “illegiti-
mate oil”. Where an illegal activity (here, trading in illegitimate oil) 
in other circumstances (legitimate oil) would have been legal, the 
illegal act is usually termed “illicit”.
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after both the buyers and the suppliers of illicit oil—a 
particularly interesting feature, considering the trans-
national nature of illicit trade.
While these new potential means of evidence may pro-
mote accountability for crimes associated with piracy 
and armed robbery against ships, an apparent lack of 
enforcement action, and the lack of Nigerian laws for 
the prosecution of offenders promises otherwise. De-
spite ratification, the UNCLOS has not been properly 
implemented and the Nigerian criminal code still lacks 
provisions for piracy and thus is inadequate to ensure 
prosecution of perpetrators of that crime, even when 
caught (UNCLOS 1982).   
In an attempt to finally address this persistent menace, 
Nigeria has recently teamed up with the Republic of 
Benin for joint maritime patrols code named “Opera-
tion Prosperity” (Usman 2011). As part of the bilateral 
agreement, the first of its kind in West Africa, the Nige-
rian Navy will patrol the waterways of Nigeria and Benin 
for a period of six months, with a view to “secure the 
maritime environment between both countries’ territo-
rial waters up to the outer extremities of both Exclusive 
Economic Zones”10  (Usman 2011). 
As may be apparent from these statements, while per-
haps aiming at preventing “piracy”, these measures are 
not exclusively designed to be employed on the Highs 
Seas, or outside the jurisdiction of any State (where pi-
racy per definition would take place), but within Exclu-
sive Economic Zones as well as territorial waters and 
hence in territory under the jurisdiction of a particular 
state. Furthermore, to the extent that the implication of 
high-ranking government and military officials cannot 
be eradicated, it seems premature to expect “Opera-
tion Prosperity” to succeed in eliminating oil bunkering, 
though it may contribute to the safeguarding of ship-
ping lanes in the Gulf of Guinea, and off Nigeria and Be-
nin specifically. In any case, judgment on that operation 
will have to be postponed.     
The Case of Somalia
The almost global attention that has been accorded 
to Somalia in recent years has mainly been due to the 
fact that the failed state label suits it all too well. Thus, 
despite increasing international cooperation and naval-
military presence, “piracy, in particular off the coast of 
10 According to UNCLOS (1982: Art. 57), “Exclusive Economic 
Zone” refers to the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, 
“not to exceed 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured”.  
Somalia, continues to threaten the safety, peace, and 
security of one of the most-frequented waterways in 
the world, the states in the region, and, by extension, to 
disrupt the global economy” (Syring 2011: 438).
According to recent numbers, an estimated 21,000 
ships pass through the Gulf of Aden on an annual basis 
and of the 489 acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships reported to the IMO to have occurred in 2010, 172 
were committed off the coast of East Africa, predomi-
nantly off Somalia. While this number represents a de-
cline from last year’s 222 attacks off East Africa, the de-
creasing number of incidents resulted in the main from 
the migration of the threat from Somalia-based pirates 
towards the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, where such 
attacks increased from 27 to 77 and from 2 to 16, re-
spectively, compared to the previous year (IMO 2011). 
While domestic capacity (or the lack thereof ) is not 
the only variable of importance in regard to curbing 
the threat of piracy, it has a significant impact on the 
prospects of fighting piracy effectively. In that sense, for 
all the weakness of the Nigerian state institutions and 
in particular its means of law enforcement, at the very 
least (as opposed to the case of Somalia) they are capa-
ble of providing significant naval forces and conducting 
patrols, even on behalf of a neighbouring state (Benin).
Naval deterrence presupposes effective patrolling, 
which in turn is closely related to the concept of ju-
risdiction and law enforcement (Syring 2011: 437). Pi-
racy, legally defined in UNCLOS as acts carried out on 
the High Seas, outside the jurisdiction of any (particu-
lar) state, is, for that very reason, considered to be the 
original universal jurisdiction crime and as such, states 
apprehending pirates would be able to assume juris-
diction and try pirates based on that concept (UNCLOS 
1982). In practice, however, states patrolling the Gulf 
of Aden as part of the international naval presence off 
Somalia have shied away from prosecuting, sometimes 
even from arresting, suspected pirates due to anticipat-
ed legal difficulties of prosecution, high expenses gen-
erally attached to transporting suspects to the domes-
tic courts of the apprehending forces, and concerns of 
potential asylum claims being put forward by pirates. 
Some of the main concerns of states pertain to the rath-
er small window of opportunity for catching suspected 
persons “in the act,”11  and the problematic status of 
pirates. Prior to the launch, a pirate vessel may merely 
appear as a fishing boat and with pirates quickly dis-
posing of weapons by throwing them overboard, any 
11 There are often no more than fifteen minutes between a 
pirate attack being launched and the action being concluded.
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evidence to the contrary soon rests safely on the sea-
bed. On the other hand, under international law pirates 
are considered to be non-combatants (Kontorovich 
2009), which puts, for example, further constraints on 
navies’ “rules of engagement”. Also, the modalities of ap-
prehension may impose additional difficulties on any 
ensuing prosecutions, as many pirates are arrested un-
der circumstances that resemble the battlefield condi-
tions criticized in regard to the apprehension of many 
Guantánamo Bay detainees, “where evidence was not 
collected or preserved as required for prosecution” (Crook 
2010; Savage 2010). 
Furthermore, having no real government to face at 
home, pirates have often successfully taken their “prey” 
(hijacked vessels) towards the shore, into Somali terri-
torial waters, where they would be safe from domestic 
prosecution as well as from international naval forces, 
since these forces would not be permitted to enter and 
exercise jurisdiction within a foreign state’s territory. 
Realizing these shortcomings, the UN Security Coun-
cil adopted a number of enforcement action resolu-
tions concerning the situation in Somalia. Recalling its 
previous resolutions with regard to Somalia (Security 
Council 2008a,b,c,d,e,f; 2009), in UN SC Res. 1950 of No-
vember 23, 2010 (Security Council 2010), the Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
decided to renew for an additional twelve months the 
authorization granted to Member States in preceding 
resolutions, pertaining to taking action against pirates 
in Somali territorial waters (“hot pursuit”)12  and extend-
ing the scope of permissible military force even to cer-
tain land-based operations in the Somalia mainland.13 
UN SC Res. 1950 also focused on holding persons sus-
pected of piracy accountable for their acts by calling 
for increased efforts to prosecute Somali pirates.14  An 
12  In other words, allowing pirates to be chased from the 
high seas into Somali territorial waters, thus preventing pirates’ “hit-
and-run” tactics.
13 The resolution noted that it was passed with the consent 
of, and following several requests for international assistance from, 
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. Cf. Security 
Council (2010).  UN SC Res. 1851 had noted in paragraph 6 that 
“States and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against 
piracy (…) off the coast of Somalia (…) may undertake all neces-
sary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of 
suppressing acts of piracy (…)” (Security Council 2008f; emphasis 
added).
14 In paragraph 13, the Security Council “[c]alls on all States, 
including States in the region, to criminalize piracy under their do-
mestic law and favorably consider the prosecution of suspected, 
and imprisonment of convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast 
of Somalia, consistent with applicable international human rights 
law” (Security Council 2010; Roach 2010: 407).
ensuing Security Council resolution on Somalia, UN SC 
Res. 2015, adopted October 24, 2011, did not involve 
enforcement action under Chapter VII— in that regard 
UN SC Res. 1950 was still valid at the time of adoption. 
However, UN SC Res. 2015 emphasized several addi-
tional aspects of particular interest in the fight against 
piracy as a transnational crime. Apart from calling on 
states in its preamble to adopt domestic “provisions 
criminalizing piracy and/or procedural provisions for 
effective criminal prosecution of suspected pirates” 
and generally reaffirming the importance of national 
prosecutions, including the hoped-for establishment 
of specialized Somali anti-piracy courts, the resolution 
requested the Transitional Federal Government of So-
malia (TFG) to:
adopt a complete set of counter-piracy laws, 
including laws to prosecute those who illicitly 
finance, plan, organize, facilitate or profit from 
pirate attacks, with a view to ensuring the effec-
tive prosecution of suspected pirates and those 
associated with piracy attacks in Somalia, the 
post-conviction transfer of pirates prosecuted 
elsewhere to Somalia, and the imprisonment of 
convicted pirates in Somalia, as soon as possi-
ble... (Security Council 2011b: Para. 7).
Furthermore, the resolution underlined the importance 
for anti-piracy courts “to have jurisdiction to be exer-
cised over not only suspects captured at sea, but also 
anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy 
operations, including key figures of criminal networks 
involved in piracy who illicitly plan, organize, facilitate, 
or finance and profit from such attacks” (Security Coun-
cil 2011b: Para. 17).
Finally, in UN SC Res. 2020 of November 22, 2011 (Se-
curity Council 2011a), the most recent resolution 
concerning Somalia, the Security Council once again 
invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and renewed au-
thorization of enforcement action for yet another year. 
While “[c]ommending the efforts of the EU operation 
Atalanta, North Atlantic Treaty Organization operations 
Allied Protector and Ocean Shield, Combined Maritime 
Forces’ Combined Task Force 151, and other States act-
ing in a national capacity … to suppress piracy” (Secu-
rity Council 2011a: Preamble) and the prosecutorial ef-
forts particularly in Kenya and the Seychelles, assisted, 
inter alia, by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), UN SC Res. 2020 in the main reiter-
ates previous “call[s] upon States and regional organi-
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zations that have the capacity to do so, to take part in 
the fight against piracy … by deploying naval vessels, 
arms and military aircraft” (Security Council 2011a: Para. 
7). Furthermore, the resolution “[u]rges all States to take 
appropriate actions under their existing domestic law 
to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the 
laundering of its proceeds” (Security Council 2011a: 
Para. 17), and stresses “the need to support the inves-
tigation and prosecution of those who illicitly finance, 
plan, organize, or unlawfully profit from pirate attacks 
off the coast of Somalia” (Security Council 2011a: Para. 
20), thus acknowledging that a successful anti-piracy 
strategy needs to focus on far more than the immedi-
ate threat posed by pirate vessels, and extending the list 
of addressees from those states establishing particular 
anti-piracy courts, envisioned in S.C. Res. 2015 (Security 
Council 2011b: Para. 17), to “all states”.  
Whether these combined efforts at fighting piracy and 
transnational crime outlined in those resolutions will 
come to fruition remains to be seen. Given, the absence 
of a functioning government is but one explanation for 
the upsurge of piratical activities,15  as in the case of So-
malia. However, with a government that lacks even the 
most basic means to effectively fight illicit activities at 
sea—and, for that matter, elsewhere—(as opposed to 
Nigeria, which at least has a functioning navy),16  what 
has been apparent from the start is that fighting piracy 
off the coast of Somalia would heavily depend on inter-
national naval efforts.
15 With reference to Somalia, it has e.g. been pointed out 
that the phenomenon of piracy as we know it today did not start 
immediately after the break down of the Siad Barre government in 
1991. In fact, the first wave of piracy on a large scale off the coast of 
Somalia did not even occur until 2004-2006, cf. e.g. Hansen (2011: 
489). Even piracy benefits from a certain level of order and relative 
“peace” ashore in the sense of “absence from total chaos”, in other 
words from less hostile a climate than the one during the heavi-
est fighting in mainland Somalia during the 1990s. Otherwise, the 
pirate infrastructure ashore, including financing and trade in pirate 
goods, may not prosper. While the upsurge in piracy thus may not 
be easily attributable to the lack of a functioning government, a 
stronger link may be established between strength of government 
and state institutions, and effectiveness in the fight against piracy. 
Other explanatory variables for a piracy upsurge may be improved 
organizational structures among pirates, increased sophistication 
in terms of weapons, navigation and tracking equipment and the 
attraction of success (previously secured high ransoms as self-en-
forcing incentives).
16 To be sure, comparing the coast off Nigeria and its neigh-
bors with the ocean off Somalia and its regional neighbors, it also 
has to be admitted that the Gulf of Guinea is not nearly as vast an 
area to patrol as the Gulf of Aden. But even so, also relatively speak-
ing, Nigeria seems better equipped than Somalia (IMO 2009b).
Preventing Pirate Attacks: 
Regional and International 
Responses 
In light of the fact that court proceedings in the major-
ity of pirate incidents are but a distant aspiration, the 
IMO has pursued a three-pronged approach, aiming 
at enhancing individual vessels’ security and alert level 
and increasing regional cooperation in addition to pro-
moting international military presence, predominantly 
in the affected Gulf of Aden area. Thus, on 29 Septem-
ber, 2009, the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) 
updated and revised its guidance on combating piracy 
and armed robbery against ships and adopted best 
management practices to deter and deal with attacks 
(IMO 2009a). These guidelines include recommenda-
tions with respect to travel routes, manning of engine 
rooms and lookouts, and more technical advice relating 
to preferred modes of communication and reporting, 
evasive manoeuvring tactics, and fire pump defensive 
measures. Despite enhanced on-board security, in the 
face of the still high-level security threat posed by pi-
rates in the area, the most preferable modus operandi 
to ship owners would be to avoid piracy infested ship-
ping lanes all together and instead employ alternative 
routes. However, in the case of Somalia such rerouting 
would e.g. involve going around South Africa, and no 
shipping company would want to go that extra (sea-) 
mile alone, carrying the extra costs to competitiveness, 
spending more time and fuel on a substantially longer 
journey, unless the majority of shipping companies col-
lectively follow through with such plans (Aftenposten 
2010).17  
With respect to fostering regional cooperation and 
coordinating governments’ action, the IMO adopted a 
Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Pi-
racy and Armed Robbery against Ships (IMO 2009a). 
Apart from urging states to take all national legislative, 
judicial, and law enforcement action necessary to en-
able them to receive, prosecute, or extradite any sus-
pected pirates and armed robbers arrested by warships 
or military aircraft, the Code was meant to be a source 
of best practice and “to provide Member States with 
an aide mémoire to facilitate the investigation of the 
crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships” (IMO 
2009b: Annex 1, Art. 1). Furthermore, when convening 
17 That point was further underlined by the head of the Nor-
wegian Ship Owner’s Association on the occasion of a conference at 
the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). See NUPI (2010).
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a meeting in Djibouti in January 2009, the IMO adopted 
a Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy 
and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indi-
an Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (the so-called Djibouti 
Code of Conduct) (IMO 2009c). The signatories commit-
ted towards sharing and reporting relevant information 
through a system of national focal points and piracy in-
formation centres established in Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Yemen, interdicting ships suspected of engaging in acts 
of piracy and other attacks against ships, and ensuring 
that persons committing or attempting to commit such 
prohibited acts are apprehended and prosecuted.
Finally, realising that successful regional cooperation 
would also depend on international naval assistance, 
the IMO has been lobbying to bring the piracy prob-
lem to the attention of the UN Security Council (Syring 
2010a), which eventually led to the adoption of the en-
forcement action resolutions detailed above. Based on 
these resolutions, states have intensified their presence, 
in particular in the Gulf of Aden, with the United States, 
United Kingdom, French, and Indian navies initially 
leading the way, and later on including, e.g. Chinese 
and Norwegian naval deployments in addition to the 
first-ever European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR) 
executing operation “Atalanta” (EU Council Joint Action 
2008). Other international efforts include NATO’s Op-
eration Allied Provider,18  Operation Allied Protector,19 
and Operation Ocean Shield. 20 
Prosecutions for piracy related incidents have so far, 
however, been relatively rare. To be sure, in the wake of 
UN SC Res. 1851 (Security Council 2008f ), urging states 
willing to prosecute piracy to enter into agreements 
with states and organizations mainly involved in patrol-
ling and physically fighting piracy, Kenya concluded 
such agreements with, inter alia, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and the EU (EUNAVFOR 2009), es-
tablishing itself as a hub for piracy prosecutions, with 
Tanzania now following suit. Eventually, as indicated in 
UN SC Res. 2015, piracy trials “conducted by courts in 
18 In the main providing escorts to UN World Food Program 
(WFP) vessels transiting through the waters off Somalia and con-
ducting deterrence patrols (October-December 2008).
19 This operation succeeded Operation Allied Provider and 
continued to fulfill its tasks, in addition to conducting surveillance 
(March-August 2009).
20 The most recent NATO operation (whose current man-
date has been extended until the end of 2012) continues the for-
mer operations’ tasks and contributes to overall maritime security 
in the region “conducting counter-piracy activities in full comple-
mentarity with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and 
with actions against piracy initiated by other actors, including the 
European Union” (NATO 2012).
Somaliland and Puntland21  are expected to reach inter-
national standards in about three years” (Security Coun-
cil 2011b: Preamble) and thus should take primacy in 
fighting crimes of piracy emanating from the region. 
As of today, prosecution capacity in the region is far 
from sufficient. However, to date, there is no interna-
tional court alternative which would have jurisdiction 
over piracy, and states taking part in the international 
naval presence have shied away from apprehending 
and prosecuting pirate suspects for the reasons out-
lined above. The emerging picture thus far has been 
that states engaged in patrolling the Gulf of Aden may 
try, if at all,22  suspected pirates who have attacked ships 
of those states’ nationality, or with nationals of those 
states being affected, for example, as crew members. 
Where no such nexus may be established, avoidance 
of active prosecution seems to be the general trend.23 
Frustrated by the lack of efficient counter-piracy meas-
ures, calls for arming civilian vessels and deploying pri-
vately contracted security personnel have been on the 
rise; some have even argued for re-introducing capital 
punishment, reminiscent of the times when captured 
pirates had to walk the plank, as a harsh but necessary 
means in curbing the threat to international shipping 
posed by piracy (Dagens Næringsliv 2011). Irrespective 
of how far those putting forward such thoughts really 
intend to see through handing down instant death 
penalties as punishment for pirates, what these com-
ments bear witness of is a profound level of discontent 
within the shipping industry, combined with a perhaps 
overwhelming feeling that any decisive enhancement 
to security would have to come from within the ship 
owners’ associations.  
In reaction to these concerns put forward by the ship-
ping industry, the IMO adopted various Maritime Safety 
Committee circulars on interim recommendations and 
21 Somaliland is an internationally recognized autonomous 
region of Somalia. Puntland is a region in Somalia, bordering Somali-
land. Leaders of both regions have declared their territories as auton-
omous states, with varying degrees of international recognition. In 
any case, in the absence of a functioning central government, both 
regions enjoy de facto sovereignty. Also, Somaliland and Puntland 
are thought to harbor the majority of all Somali pirates.
22 Sometimes even despite the existence of such a nexus, 
prosecutions have been avoided. In May 2010, for example, the 
Russian navy released a group of Somali pirates captured a couple 
of days earlier in an operation to recover a seized Russian tanker, 
apparently due to lack of a clear legal basis for prosecuting them. 
See, e.g. Barry (2010).
23 That may, however, change over time. Norway, e.g., has 
currently no naval presence in the region. Nevertheless she is con-
sidering prosecuting pirates in Norway, if asked to, or on her own 
initiative. See, e.g. Aftenposten (2012).
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guidelines for port, coastal, and flag states, and ship 
owners, ship operators, and shipmasters regarding the 
use of privately contracted armed security personnel 
(PCASP) on board ships in High Risk Areas (IMO 2011b). 
Underlining that “[t]he use of PCASP should not be con-
sidered as an alternative to Best Management Practices 
(BMP) and other protective measures” the IMO also 
pointed out that it was not “endorsing the use of pri-
vately contracted armed security personnel”. Therefore, 
in that regard, the guidelines were not meant to repre-
sent any fundamental changes of policy by the Organi-
zation. Rather, acknowledging that an increased level of 
threat to commercial shipping by Somalia-based pirates 
has led to extended use of armed guards and a marked 
expansion in the number of firms offering armed mari-
time security services, and that shipping companies 
may find it difficult to identify reliable, professional pri-
vate providers of armed security (IMO 2011c),24  these 
circulars were merely meant as an aid to companies and 
states anyways opting for employing PCASP.
Conclusion
Piracy may be regarded as a crime of transnational na-
ture, and, to a certain extent, as the ultimate or “ablative” 
transnational crime—with correspondingly complex 
responses needed, if eradicating or at least significantly 
curbing its impact is at issue. Where the threat to in-
ternational shipping occurs in a region with somewhat 
functioning, although weak, state institutions, includ-
ing available national naval forces (as in the case of pi-
racy off the coast of Nigeria), the regional state or states 
mostly affected may prevail in the fight against piracy 
by focusing on joining and coordinating their forces, 
and preventing pirates’ trade in illicit oil and other prod-
ucts illegally acquired in the course of an attack. 
Where, on the other hand, a functioning government is 
largely absent, national naval resources lacking, and the 
area in need of patrolling so vast as in the case of piracy 
off the coast of Somalia, international naval presence 
represents a necessary, although far from sufficient 
condition. Promoting the implementation of domestic 
laws in various states enabling piracy prosecutions, the 
creation of piracy courts and education of judges in the 
24 In fact, the IMO cited, inter alia, the “absence of applicable 
regulation and industry self-regulation coupled with complex le-
gal requirements governing the legitimate transport, carriage and 
use of firearms” as reason for caution. The situation was “further 
complicated by the rapid growth in the number of private mari-
time security companies (PMSC) and doubts about the capabilities 
and maturity of some of these companies”.
region as well as internationally, and the actual appre-
hension and prosecution of suspected pirates, in addi-
tion to enhancing the situation for people ashore, are 
equally mandatory for a promising approach towards 
fighting piracy.
States unwilling to prosecute suspected pirates, not 
least Western states, often cite a lack of adequately 
implemented international treaties or national laws 
pertaining to piracy prosecution, evidentiary prob-
lems (the sort of evidence acquired and the mode it 
had been acquired may not live up to the high Human 
Rights trial standard in the respective countries), and, 
although less readily admitted, concerns for potential 
asylum claims by suspected, and convicted pirates, as 
reasons for their refusal to prosecute. At the same time, 
regional prosecutorial capacities are still underdevel-
oped. In the face of these realities, calls for employing 
privately contracted armed security personnel may 
be understandable. However, manning civilian vessels 
with armed seafarers, and encouraging the use of force 
to fight off presumed pirates, may lead to a dangerous-
ly blurry line between civilians and combatants, while 
concomitantly contributing to an escalation of violence 
on the high seas. This inability of drawing a clear dis-
tinction had once been realized as a lethal dilemma of 
international law, culminating in the Laconia affair dur-
ing World War II.25  It might still be a non-commendable 
idea in the present circumstances.26 
Contemplating the current state of affairs, only con-
certed action involving international naval deterrence, 
legislative and juridical empowerment, and coordi-
nated efforts at fighting trade in illicit goods as well 
as enhancing the conditions of life in the most piracy 
prone regions, may promise success in globally fighting 
piracy and related transnational crimes. Hence, not all 
is for the best; neither is there a need to be desperately 
pessimistic. But perhaps we have to follow Candide and 
further “cultivate our garden”.  
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